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Introduction
Liquefied natural gas (LNG), according to the Inter-
national Energy Agency projections, could account for
about half of global gas trade by 2030. The Middle
East is pivotally positioned to benefit from changing
trends in the Pacific and Atlantic gas markets because
it holds the largest proven reserve. Furthermore, due
to population and economic growth, the Middle East
is one of the fastest growing consumer regions in the
world.
Given the emerging global market for LNG, efforts
are beingmade to set up a framework for trading LNG
spot and futures contracts in the Middle East. Qatar’s
InternationalMercantile Exchange (IMEX) is designing
these contracts to be traded in a manner similar to
dated-Brent crude oil contract.1 Similarly, Dubai Multi
Commodity Centre (DMCC) plans to build an LNG
Storage Facility2 that would enable customers to store,
trade andmanage LNGsupplieswith opportunities for
LNG loans and quality blending. TheDubaiMercantile
Exchange (DME)3 also intends to list LNG futures
contracts, and is considering collaborationwithQatar.4
The above developments indicate great optimism
about LNG trade but it does seem that the projects
are indirectly aimed at enhancing market liquidity
and the rate of LNG commoditisation. The projects’
proponents and developers are presuming that the
creation of LNG contracts on an exchange is a sufficient
condition for price autonomy and transparency
regionally (or globally). But this may be a case of
putting the cart before thehorse, since spot transactions
are still few5 and seasonal.Against this background it is
* o.n.wagbara@dundee.ac.uk.
1 The contracts are being developed by Hess Energy Trading
Company (Hetco) and Clifford Chance, to be regulated by the
Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA).
2 In partnership with Canadian LNG Firm IMPEL.
3 DME is owned jointly by the New YorkMercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) Holdings Incorporated and the governments of
Oman and Dubai.
4 Unofficial discussions have begun as reported in Platts, DME
considering joint LNG futures with Qatar, at http://www.platts.com.
5 Spot transactions make about 13.8% of global gas trade, but
the number of transactions is also increasing.
therefore pertinent to question the extent towhichLNG
contracts could be competitively traded in a hub. This
article, essentially, aims to determine the feasibility
of a competitive LNG trading platform in the Middle
East (the largest source of Liquefied Natural Gas).
An LNG Hub, in this context, implies an exchange
for tradeable LNG contracts (spot and futures). An
LNG Hub is considered ‘‘liquid’’ if it is transparent
and competitive6 enough to set a benchmark for the
indexation of spot and long-term LNG Contracts.
The issues discussed here are important because
a major challenge which LNG producers have
continually faced (with respect to pricing) is the lack of
liquidity and depth in the global gasmarket. This effort
is pertinent because previous attempts to list LNG spot
and futures contract on exchanges have failed due to
illiquidity—insufficient transaction volume to achieve
competitive trade and profitability. Furthermore,
as competition for LNG supplies increases, it is
expected that theMiddle East (especially Qatar) would
eventually transmit price signals across the Pacific and
Atlantic markets. It can be appreciated more given the
confused state of energy pricing globally.
The article focuses on the global LNG industry
with some emphasis on the Middle East and adopts
a comparative approach on the assumption that
LNG contracts could be traded like dated-Brent
contracts.7 The effort reveals that a robust and effective
mechanism for determining price is essential for
attracting many participants to achieve liquidity. To
a large extent, liquidity in any LNG trading hub
would depend on an interactive relationship between
long run and short run LNG prices. Furthermore, a
defined LNG-pipeline gas price relationship, linking
the Atlantic Hubs and Asia Pacific markets with the
potential Middle East Hub is essential. The author
resolves the fundamental questions of ‘‘where’’ and
‘‘how’’ the hub’s price would be determined. The
analytical frameworkwhichdefines liquidity andother
concepts used in the work are below. Issues relevant
to competitive exchange-based LNG contracts in the
Middle East are also raised and discussed.
Description of concepts, case study
and analytical framework
‘‘Spot transaction’’ is the physical exchange of a
commoditywithnearbydelivery at theprevailingprice
in the market, exchange or delivery point. Petroleum
prices are often referenced to a delivery point or an
exchange. In commodity trading, the delivery point is
very important because transportation cost is vital in
energy trade.
A futures contract is a standard agreement, traded
on an exchange, for buying and selling a fixed amount
of a commodity to be delivered on a certain future date
at a preset contract price.
The Brent crude oil contract was developed by BP
and Shell in the late 1970s and it evolved around the
physical trading of Brent blend. Today, a cash-settled
Brent futures trade is provided by the Intercontinental
6 That is; has a wide range of both buyers and sellers.
7 This is irrespective of whether it is launched in Qatar, Dubai
or jointly.
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Exchange (ICE) and the physical crude Brent is the
main benchmark. Due to production decline in the
North Sea, however, Brent has been combined with
Forties and Oseberg streams as BFO.
Equity cargoes are the stocks8 of BFO crude blends
held by different stakeholders. The nomination pro-
cedure (for loading vessels at a terminal) determines
the nature of contracts and structure of Brent trade. In
the 21-day-forward market, contracts for delivery in
future months are traded. The exact three-day loading
window may not be known but the contracts are sub-
sequently nominated and sellers notify buyers 21 days
in advance.
Dated-Brent is a contract with a previously
nominated window less than 21 days in advance. In
other words, they are cash-market or liquid Brent
cargoes assigned to load less than 21 days ahead
of time and are therefore sometimes referred to as
‘‘wet’’ barrels. Rather than physical delivery, financial
settlements (payment) for the commodity’s value on
the delivery date are common. Dated-Brent is used as
a case study9 because:
• its price is formed in a transparent manner
through a robust methodology;
• it is, therefore, a good marker as a wide
range of counterparties (both sellers and buyers)
participate, without restriction, in Brent trade; and
• it is easy to complywith the terms of entry to the
market and there are no constraints on its delivery
infrastructure.10
In addition, the following features, which underlie
liquid trading of Brent cargoes on the ICE, are used as
the criteria for analysis:
Price determination
Generally, Brent trades at a discount toWTI11 because it
comprises light sweet crude blends which are heavier
and sourer than the WTI crude basket. This unique
blend-price relationship (Brent/WTI and Brent/Dubai
spreads) determines the global flowof crude oil. It then
becomes pertinent to ask how such a (defined) price
relationship could be created for LNG contracts.
Market participants and equity cargoes
International oil companies; oil trading companies;
investment banks and national oil companies partic-
ipate in Brent trade. Would tradeable LNG contracts be
attractive to a similar set of stakeholders? The produc-
tion capacity and storage levels of BFO blends held by
producing companies affect the price of dated-Brent.
For instance, disproportionate price movements result
in market distortions as smaller physical basis alter
trading positions. What blends or combinations of LNG
8 This includes the production capacity/levels.
9 As in every imperfect market, as soon as any of these
conditions becomes lacking or weak the market price becomes
open to manipulation.
10 Oxford Analytica, Crude-oil benchmarks’ ties go awry, June 19,
2007 at http://www.oxan.com.
11 West Texas Intermediate (WTI) deliverable against the New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures contract.
would underlie a tradeable LNG contract and which coun-
tries would stake their capacity as Equity Stock? What
combinations of physical and paper LNG would underlie an
effective exchange?
Tradeability (Trade Pattern)
There are no restrictions on dated-Brent’s tradeability
in long-term LNG contracts. The value, volume and
transaction rate of a financial instrument (like futures
and options) on an exchange is driven by price
volatility. Dated-Brent is competitively traded because
various factors (especially storage and production
capacity) affect oil price volatility. With respect to
trading LNG futures/spot contracts, therefore, it is
pertinent to consider what set of factors would be
significantly affect price and to what extent storage capacity
would affect trade levels in the Exchange.
What are the prospects and
constraints to liquidity?
Prospects for liquidity
Evolving LNG trade and the quest for more flexibility
Some Middle East exporting countries are not yet
in the spot market, but are tied to long-term deals
with relatively unattractive prices. If they utilise the
opportunity of an exchange to capture rent, liquidity
and confidence in tradeable LNG contracts would be
high.
Furthermore, importers’ keen interest to diversify
supply would, consequently, make the hub a competi-
tive platform formanaging the various risks associated
with globalisation of LNG trade.
Price volatility
The competitiveness of a trading hub and the value of
its contracts depend significantly on the price volatility
of the commodity being traded. Seasonal demand
and price variations offer significant attraction for gas
traders to hedge risks by trading LNG contracts.
Constraints to liquidity
Reference price and market determination
The lackof an international pricemarker for natural gas
is, however, a major obstacle towards the competitive
trading of LNG. Because an organised market is
required for the emergence of a price reference,
some have argued that an exchange-traded spot LNG
contract could yield a global price benchmark. Since
there are two competitive regional natural gas spot
markets, it may be necessary, therefore, to answer
the fundamental questions of ‘‘Which’’, ‘‘Where’’ and
‘‘How’’.
Which?
In continental Europe and Asia Pacific, gas prices are
cloaked in secrecy, while the US Henry Hub (HH) and
the UK’s National Balancing Point (NBP) offer more
transparent prices. Although their prices are often
comparatively divergent, however, both markets have
their peculiar strengths and weaknesses, with respect
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to setting the international marker price for LNG. It
is pertinent that these strengths and weaknesses are
considered when creating the methodology for price
formation in the exchange.
Where?
Sullum Voe (Shetland Islands) is the terminal for
Brent’s 21-day-forward market. For LNG, where
would the loading terminal or storage hub be situated?
This is a central issue because of the high transport
component of price. Furthermore, where would the
price be determined (in the sophisticated importing
markets or the evolving Middle East)?
How?
Howwill price on the trading platform be linked to the
organised gasmarkets in the consuming regions, while
ensuring a high degree of global price transparency?
Furthermore, does a long run price path exist for
globally or regionally-traded LNG? If yes, to what
extent does it determine or is it influenced by short
run price variations? Does a definite relationship exist
between the short and long run prices?
Long-term contracts
Exporters’ interest in tradeable spot and futures
contracts may be an indication that they anticipate,
potentially, greater benefits from short-term LNG
trade. This paper contends, however, that LNG
exporters are keen to maintain the long-term contract
regime. Liquidity in an LNG Hub, therefore, would
depend on the number of exporting countries that opt-
in, as well as, the number of arms length transactions.
Given fewer transactions the exchange-generatedprice
becomes unsuitable for price indexation.
Domestic Market policies
The European Commission’s Directive on increased
gas storage could affect stakeholder interest and reduce
liquidity. Without the directive, buyers would only
need to compare storage costs against the futures price.
The considerable underground storage capacity which
exists in the US gas industry, as well as inadequate
shipping capacity and the rising cost of building new
vessels can constrain competition in any storage or
contracts market for LNG.
The gas and electricity pricing policies of importing
and exporting countries further compounds the above
constraints. In many OECD countries, gas is highly
overpriced12 because gas prices are determinedmainly
through oil price indexation. Conversely, gas is
under priced in the exporting countries, which leads
to inefficiency in gas consumption and potentially
constrains LNG exports, as well as, liquidity.
Overcoming constraints: What
conditions would ensure liquidity?
Price determination
Which?
Comparatively, in volume terms, the HH price has
better prospects than the NBP because more gas
12 Relative to what the supply and demand balance should
permit if the market was competitive.
is traded at the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX.).13 However, in terms of volatility, in the
short run, the NBP price is more advantageous than
the HH price. Worth noting also, is the fact that the
UK gas market would potentially interact more with
other European gas markets (and their oil products-
indexed gas prices). With respect to exchange-traded
LNG contracts fig.1 (below) shows the price trends
of the different consuming markets across the globe.
If either the NBP or HH price becomes the relevant
benchmark,what will happen to Asian buyers in terms
of pricing?
Where?
Essentially, liquidity requires that price balances the
acts of buying and selling, so that the marginal
convenience yield14 reflects the opportunity cost
of buying spot LNG rather than futures. Most
transactionsmay involve cash-settlements, as in dated-
Brent, but a storage market is vital for the exchange-
traded LNG contracts to be competitively traded.
Consequently, Dubai’s LNG storage Hub (DHUB)
is a suitable option if it collaborates with Qatar’s IMEX
and satisfies the above condition.
LNG projects confer equity on its partners, in the
form of liquefaction capacity and off-take rights which
they generally use to service their downstream supply
commitments. To the extent that downstream15 gains
are higher than exchange-related benefits, it is unlikely
that such stakeholders would trade in theMiddle East.
Irrespective of where the hub is situated, the key issue
is therefore making it attractive to all stakeholders in
the industry, and not only exporters.
How and why?
It may be observed from fig.1 that NYMEX and NBP
prices are more volatile than the Japanese, Spanish
and Korean prices, while fig.2 reveals that a trend or
correlation exists between Japan’s LNG price and the
Atlantic Basin markets’ prices. A premium of about
$1/MMBtu can be estimated from the data over the
period. To ensure competition, it is essential that these
markets interact continually to determine or influence
the price of any Exchange-traded LNG contracts. This
paper, therefore, asserts that comparing the price levels
across regions on each trading day would effectively
ensure this.
In proposing a pricing system, let ‘‘A’’ represent
the higher of HH and NBP prices, and ‘‘B’’ the
transport cost of a Middle East LNG vessel to and
from the Atlantic Basin. The efficient opening price
for a tradable LNG spot contract can, therefore, be set
as ‘‘A’’ minus ‘‘B’’. This simply means the higher of
HH and NBP prices less transport cost to and from the
Atlantic Basin. Such a mechanism is further justified by
the emerging relationship, depicted in fig.3, between
Japan’s delivered price for spot LNG from the Atlantic
and the higher of HH and NBP prices.
A review of the 19 month data (in fig.3) shows a
premium that equals the transport cost to and from the
Middle East. It is interesting to note that the graphs
13 The NYMEX is the first and most experienced exchange for
spot trading gas in the world.
14 This is also called marginal value of storage.
15 In the consuming markets of Europe and the US.
[2008] I.E.L.R. ISSUE 3  SWEET &MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
WAGBARA: IS A LIQUID LNG HUB IN THE MIDDLE EAST FEASIBLE?: [2008] I.E.L.R. 99
Figure 1: Price trends of global LNG consuming markets (2006–2008)
Figure 2: Japanese LNG price compared with HH and NBP (1988–2001)
(Source) IEA "Energy Prices & Taxes"
Figure 3: Japanese delivered price v the higher of HH and NBP16
in figs 2 and 3 look similar, even though different
variables are compared.
16 LNG Focus, October 2007.
The implication is that at any time, LNG price at the
exchange is determined by either natural gas prices in
the Atlantic Basin (NBP/HH) or market fundamentals
within the Middle East. Although they do not have
a defined relationship, spot and contractual LNG
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prices are not disconnected because, irrespective of the
indexationmode, gas prices reflect the scarcity of other
fuels. Oil price is, essentially, a common link between
them, but the relationship is lagged through Japan’s
Crude Cocktail (JCC)17 and continental Europe’s oil-
product indexation. Oil and competitive gas prices
alignover the long term, but in the short term,however,
gasmarket dynamics generate surpluses and shortages
that are commercially significant.
The price mechanism, proposed above, efficiently
captures the short-term profitability interest of indus-
try players and the long-term effect of oil-price index-
ation. To attract a large number of arms length trans-
actions to the exchange, therefore, contract prices must
be linked directly or indirectly to gas prices in the
mature spot markets (as Brent is linked to WTI).
Transparent Regulatory Framework
It is pertinent that contracts are transparently designed,
within a sound regulatory framework, to earn the
confidence of industry stakeholders and traders.
Although, not fundamentally a constraint, it could be
a complex issue to handle for LNG due to the various
price regimes; lack of storage markets and existing
long-term contracts. Alternatively, the exchange could
beutilizedas aplatform for trading long-termcontracts
in the form of swaps and options to enhance liquidity.
A vital issue for consideration is how the combination
of physical and paper elements of LNG trade would
be regulated.
17 Market observers and some experts consider JCC price
series as reliable and it is widely used for LNG price indexation
(escalation clauses) in Northeast Asia.
Conclusion
Exchange-traded LNG contracts, backed by equity
stock (storage hub), may be designed and listed by
committed investors in the Middle East but its liquid-
ity, however, would be determined to a large extent
by other factors beyond the investors’ control. Three
essential conditions are an effective methodology for
price determination, sound regulatory framework and
high demand. Gas reserves and supply infrastructure
are important, but are secondary requirements for
achieving competition.
The exchange may well develop (in volume terms)
but we cannot expect to see the transparency that
exists in the mature Atlantic spot markets. Given
the persistent LNG demand, the region could have
a benchmark price for LNG through the exchange.
The Middle East can only become an independent
region for price discovery, however, when its
dominance in the global LNG market begins to have
profound pricing impacts in end-user markets. Lack of
competitive domestic gas markets, amidst increasing
consumption within the region, is also a constraining
factor that needs further consideration.
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